University of Mississippi

eGrove
Touche Ross Publications

Deloitte Collection

1977

Does government regulation work?
Eric L. Stattin

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Tempo, Vol. 23, no. 1 (1977), p. 34-37

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Touche Ross Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

DOES GOVERNMENT REGULATION WORK?
by ERIC L. S T A T T I N , N a t i o n a l Service D i r e c t o r f o r Savings a n d L o a n , Los A n g e l e s

Regulation of business by government is not new. The
Emperor Hammurabi established a central government in
Babylon around 2000 BC and promulgated a code of over
300 laws. Some dealt with business activity and seemed to
be aimed at assuring integrity in business dealings.
Some 15 centuries later, Aristotle wrote the following:
" H e w h o purposes duly to manage any branch of economy
should be well acquainted with the locality in which he
undertakes to labor and should be naturally clever, and by
choice industrious and just; for if any one of these qualities
be wanting, he will make many mistakes in the business
which he intends to take in h a n d . "
Aristotle was talking about management of business, not
its regulation by government. Today, however, much business decision-making and policy-setting are preempted by
specific government regulation or by a regulatory agency.
Are the qualities Aristotle required in a business manager
present in today's regulatory bureaucracy?
O n e way or another, most of American business is
regulated by federal, state, and local government. Some
industries are more closely regulated than others: the
railroads, truckers, and public utilities, for example. They
have territories, rates, quality of service, and even
accounting systems prescribed for them. Financial institutions are also closely regulated by federal and state
authorities, and it is the effectiveness of that regulation
which is to be questioned here. Does government
regulation of financial institutions work?
There is plenty of evidence that government regulation
of financial institutions does not work. There is even more
public opinion to that effect. A skeptic might even suggest
that in those circumstances where regulation does seem to
work, other factors are really responsible.
The present regulatory system was shaped by conditions
which were generally negative and which the public and
the institutions themselves wanted to avoid repeating. Of
all the calamities, the Great Depression was probably the
most p r o f o u n d .
Notwithstanding this negative genesis, most regulators of
financial institutions see their role as one of making positive
contributions to our society and our economy. Naturally,
there are obvious conflicting interests. Businessmen,
homeowners, and trustees of deposit insurance funds
w o u l d measure success differently. How regulators deal
with these interests is one way of gauging their success.
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The Regulatory Tightrope
The Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 and the National
Housing Act of 1934 were drawn to provide emergency
relief to homeowners then suffering from the Depression
and to encourage future thrift and home ownership. The
federal savings and loan system, Federal Home Loan Bank
System, and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) were created to help meet these objectives.
Federal insurance of bank deposits came into being also.
Perhaps the greatest conflict among regulators of
financial institutions is that which exists between the
providers of capital and the users of capital. Other conflicts
exist within the classes of capital providers and within the
classes of capital users. Lately there have also arisen c o n flicts between regulatory agencies. For example, the SEC
and federal bank regulators disagree over how full " f u l l "
disclosure should be for publicly owned banks. The SEC
wants bank stockholders to be fully informed, while bank
regulators are fearful that bad news might cause the
depositors to lose confidence and bolt.
How do the regulators deal with conflicts and decide
which policy will best serve the " p u b l i c interest"? The
savings and loan industry represents a simple example of
providers (mainly individual savers) w h o had put up $286
billion at year end 1975. How does the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board balance thrift, economical home ownership,
and the interests of the FSLIC?
A federally chartered savings and loan organization is
required to make most of its home loans to people of
modest means. Regulations also prescribe the maximum
loan to value ratios and require that most loans be made on
properties within a prescribed distance of their off ice. Such
limitations are intended to reduce the investment risk, and
thus protect the savers' interests and the FSLIC.
But what happens when people of less than modest
means expect or are perceived by politicians as deserving to
become homeowners? Many of these families cannot come
up with a 20 percent d o w n payment on even a $30,000
home. When that home inflates in value 10 percent or more
annually, the prospective homeowner is further behind.
The government's response has been to subsidize both
the risk and the direct cost of housing. The problem is that a
few of these arrangements are in the form of hidden
subsidies that offer a potential for regulatory abuse. For
example, the FHLBB is under no legal or self-imposed

requirement when it decides what net worth must be maintained to protect savers and the FSLIC. (Perhaps even
weaker statutes exist for the banking industry.) Nor is the
General Accounting Office, to the writer's knowledge,
required to examine the propriety of the FHLBB's net worth
requirements or the FHLBB's administration of its rules.
Thus, there is an accountability gap, and capital providers
can unknowingly lose their net worth protection.
The "redlining" issue, so much in the news lately, is
another example of a conflict between providers and users
of capital. O n the one side, inner city borrowers complain
that lenders (mostly S&Ls since they finance the majority of
single-family homes) refuse to lend in their neighborhoods. A red line is drawn, in effect, on a map delineating
the area in which loans are not made. Usually these areas
are racially changing, which raises the specter of discrimination, too.
However, regulatory agencies are not at all certain that
lending money in areas which appear inevitably headed for
urban decline is in the interests of the lending institutions,
its savers, or the FSLIC. Ironically, independent studies of
urban decline show that disappearance of financing is one
of the last factors in the process. In other words, withholding mortgage credit because of perceived urban
decline is not a self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is hard to fault the intent of legislators and regulators
when it comes to opposition to redlining. It is highly doubtful, though, that their response—requiring the disclosure
of lending patterns—will open up a flow of housing credit
to the inner city. Prior attempts at credit allocation in the
form of government-supported housing projects clearly
have not worked well.

The Regulation Q Debate
Regulation Q presents another clear conflict between the
providers and users of capital in the S&L and banking
industries. Regulation Q , which controls interest rates that
may be paid by banks and S&Ls, was first adopted to prevent
banks from waging interest rate wars.
When savings and loan associations were brought under
a rate control statute in 1966, it was for somewhat the same
reasons as for banks 30 odd years earlier, except there was
no general depression. There was concern, instead, that too
much money was being taken out of the East and invested
in the West Coast S&Ls. These S&Ls, mainly in California,

were thought to have fully exploited the market for sound
loans and there was concern that a further rapid savings
growth would lead to serious loan portfolio problems.
The regulatory authority clearly is acting in the interest of
savers when it acts to curtail unsound growth. But it is not
entirely clear that instituting rate control on consumer
savings has had that effect. Many S&Ls in California and
Nevada were de facto failures, anyway, as a result of growth
which took place prior to 1966. Some of these failures were
not dealt with decisively until the 1970s; and to top it off,
rate control on S&Ls was legislated in the first year of "disintermediation," precisely when many S&Ls could have
benefitted from freedom to compete on a price basis. Interestingly, some of the political pressure to subject S&Ls to
rate control came from the banking industry, which was
becoming conscious of the consumer savings market.
Now, 10 years later, Regulation Q is the law of the land.
O n passbook savings, banks cannot pay over five percent,
while S&Ls can pay 5Vi percent. Similar differentials exist for
longer term accounts.

A chocking account was considered a privilege
reserved for those who had money, and an account
in our bank implied a certain standing. A new
account was not opened unless the prospective
depositor had a proper introduction. . . . A bank
check was not (hen the common medium of
exchange that it is now, and a depositor who
insisted on drawing a great number of checks for
small amounts would be reprimanded by the
cashler•

—AN "OLD TIME BANKER"

Is the saver's ox being gored by Regulation Q? That
depends on whether one deals with a large or small saver,
with a sophisticated or unsophisticated saver. The small
saver has no choice. He cannot beat Regulation Q by going
into Treasury bills at 7.5 percent or better because the price
of admission is too high. So the little guy is stuck with 5
percent at a bank or 5VA percent at an S&L.
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But what about savers in federally insured financial institutions as a group? Are they being allowed to earn a fair
return? Aside from the stated objective of protecting S&Ls
as providers of housing finance, it is really difficult to rationalize a lower return for savers in banks compared to savers
in S&Ls. W h o are the beneficiaries of this price-setting?
Specifically, the beneficiaries are homeowners w h o were
either clever or fortunate enough to borrow o n a fixed rate
prior to 1973. These users of capital enjoy interest rates of
about 6 to 8 percent and are being subsidized, in effect, by
borrowers at 9 t o 10 percent a n d / o r savers as a group.
The regulatory response to this inflation-induced
dilemma has not been particularly effective, or perhaps
even appropriate. Variable rate mortgages have been
proposed by the FHLBB but shot down by Congress. M o r t gage repayment terms have been stretched to the limit,
arguably even t o the disadvantage of the borrower, w h o
has traded a 30-year loan for a 40-year loan, with weekly
reductions in loan payments equivalent to a six-pack of
beer. At the same time, the FHLBB has looked the other way
as profitability of S&Ls continued to be on the low side, with
an accompanying slippage in net worth ratios.
The Insurers' Dilemma
FDIC and FSLIC insure deposits of up to $40,000. At yearend 1975, banks had total domestic deposits of almost $900
billion, and S&Ls had total deposits of $286 billion. FDIC had
reserves for losses of about $6 billion and FSLIC had
reserves for losses of about $4 billion. Both agencies have
statutory lines of credit with the US Treasury. (It is of interest
that all these assets have been borrowed by the US government and used for purposes not easily determinable.)
Both agencies have been put to some fairly tough tests
and survived. FSLIC has made payoffs to savers that
exceeded $100 million after one failure. It has also used its
default prevention powers for institutions ranging in size
up to $1 billion. While FDIC has not suffered payoff experiences of the magnitude of FSLIC, it has faced the collapse of
banks ranging up to $5 billion in assets.
Given the deposit insurers' large exposure and relatively
small resources, is there a proper balance of concern on the
part of the regulators between the need for risk taking and
the need to keep FDIC and FSLIC losses at tolerable levels?
Or is there a bias built into the system which tends to deny
financial institutions the " r i g h t to fail"? This issue is different between the banking industry and the S&L industry,
because on the S&L side, the principal regulator of behavior
is also the overseer of the FSLIC. FDIC, on the other hand, is
not the principal regulator for many insured banks and
must take its cue from other federal or state agencies. The
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result is some degree of corporate schizophrenia. Are
FSLIC and FDIC to be pure insurance functions, or are they
to also perform other roles, such as muscling financial institutions into behaving in certain ways w i t h o u t regard to the
insurance risk involved?

There is no legislation—/
care not what it is—tariff,
railroad, corporation,
or of a general
political
character, that at all equals in importance
the
putting of our banking and currency systems on the
sound basis proposed
in the National
Money
Commission
[Aldrich]
plan.
—WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, 1911

The business of federal regulation is replete with
examples of massive overkill, mostly in the name of
consumer protection. Blame for this certainly does not lie
exclusively with the regulatory agencies, but a major share
does belong to the federal regulators. W h e n Congress perceives mistreatment of consumers, it confers more power
and responsibility on the regulators. A n example:
Regulation Z (by no means the last) is a Congressional
enactment which is intended to protect borrowers from
being misled on the real cost of credit. The popular title of
this legislation is "Truth in Lending." From that, one might
conclude that there was a significant public harm done by
lenders w h o lied or misrepresented or did not fully or
properly disclose what credit actually cost. No doubt there
have been incidents of consumer abuse. But it is probably
also true that those w h o are hurt by excessively costly credit
or unfair credit arrangements will not benefit by knowing
the " t r u e annual percentage rate" on a loan. (I am thinking
of the victim w h o gives back $20 to the loan shark on Friday
for the $10 he borrowed on Monday.)
There is an ironic twist in all this government protection
of the consumer. Before Congress intervened, the overwhelming majority of Americans had for many years benefitted from the finest, low-cost consumer credit system in
the w o r l d . Hopefully, this will continue in spite of
Congress' well-meaning but misguided efforts.
Not too incidentally, the regulatory bureaucracies were
relatively silent in testifying to the true need for Regulation
Z. That is consistent with the nature of the bureaucratic
process, which is generally n o t t o t u r n d o w n an opportunity
for growth.

The regulators are being told by Congress to train their
elephant guns on different gnats almost every day. The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, the
Bank Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Bank Holding Company Act, the Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act, the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act,
and a series of "Emergency H o u s i n g " acts are all on the
books. Other legislative proposals have been trial ballooned, such as the Financial Institutions Act of 1975 and
the 1976 follow-on Financial Reform Act. The latter even
went so far as to propose a reform of sorts for the financial
regulatory agencies.
The Prognosis for Regulation
It is probably going to get worse, worse being defined as
more. Unfortunately, government regulations tend to
multiply like bacteria in a nutrient-rich culture. The
regulated industries in the case of regulators are the culture
and, up to now, have been able to support a sustained
growth of the regulators. As a result, however, financial
institutions' profitability, especially for the thrifts, has not
been adequate on balance since 1962. (Not that declining
profitability is likely to deter growth. O n e recalls C. N o r t h cote Parkinson observing the growth of the British
Admiralty during a period when commissioned capital
ships decreased by almost 68 percent; meanwhile, the
Admiralty grew in number of officials by over 78 percent.)
As a nation, we are rushing pell-mell into regulation by
government of practically all our activities. At the same
time, there is a growing feeling that our government is less
and less representative of the people. The confluence of inordinate control by a nonrepresentative government
should be a frightening prospect. Yet most people seem to
believe that business needs to be more highly regulated.
Even businessmen seem to embrace the status q u o . Suggest
a lessening of regulation—like putting Regulation Q on a
51/2-year phaseout—and most of the S&L industry and even
some banks become very concerned.
Regulatory reform is a difficult, political issue. Given the
entrenched special interests of the regulatory agencies'
staffs and the transient, short-time political appointee
status of agency chairmen and board members, it is
probably impossible to reform the system short of a major
Congressional effort. Meanwhile specific modifications
should be considered in the financial institutions area:
1. The regulatory powers of the agencies should be more
stringently defined. Regulators should not be able to
manage business conduct through financial institutions.
2. Prior to adopting consumerist legislation, there should
be demonstrated significant abuse and an absence of

existing law to deal with the p r o b l e m , plus provision for an
independent monitoring system to prove the efficiency of
any legislative/regulatory solution. Congress should also
require a cost/benefit analysis before any new regulatory
empowerment.
3. Combine bank and S&L regulation, central bank
systems, and deposit insurance systems in three agencies,
one for each of the three basic functions.
4. If the combination cannot be effected, the regulatory
system for the two industries should be organized on a
parallel basis. This w o u l d be patterned after the bank
regulatory system but with the insurance, central banking,
and regulatory functions clearly separated.
5. The process for selecting political appointees to
regulatory agencies should better reflect public interest.
6. Full disclosure of all information necessary to prudent
decision-making should be the rule.
7. Premium rates for deposit insurance should partially
reflect the underwriting risks involved.
Resistance to change is a c o m m o n human trait. So it is
w i t h organizations. But there is danger in this response. For
if the regulatory functions of government do not respond
to changing needs and conditions, the pressure will mount
for abrupt and radical change, perhaps even chaotic
change. O n e need not look too far back in time to observe
chaotic change. Compare these points of view:
"The statesman, w h o should attempt to direct private
people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals,
w o u l d not only load himself with a most unnecessary
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be
trusted not only to no single person, but to no council or
senate whatever, and which w o u l d nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man w h o had folly and
presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it."
" W e should by one way or the other arrive at the bureaucratization of the economic activities of the n a t i o n . "
Whose points of view were they? Adam Smith and Benito
Mussolini, in that order.
G

There is not in this country and there has never
been in any country of the civilized
world a
government
issue or banknote
issue comparable
in
security to the Federal reserve notes provided
by
the bill which you are now asked to enact into law.
—CARTER GLASS, 1913
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